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I. Introduction 
 Development of the DVD (Digital Versatile Disc, formerly known as the Digital 
Video Disc) was perhaps the most significant innovation in entertainment since color 
television.  DVD players and pre-recorded films penetrated U.S. homes at a rate faster 
than any consumer electronics device on record.1  Movie studios realized unprecedented 
revenue growth, with DVD sales of movies rivaling and even exceeding corresponding 
box office receipts.  Furthermore, the new digital format neatly replaced the quickly 
aging medium of VHS, while offering studios a far higher profit margin than its analog 
predecessor (66% vs. 45%)2.  In 2003, a mere eight years after the invention of the DVD, 
it appeared that Hollywood had found a high growth machine for the next decade. 
 Then, suddenly, the trends shifted.  In 2005, unit growth in U.S. shipments of 
DVD films and TV shows fell to just 9% year-over-year, compared to 50% growth in 
both 2003 and 2004.3  As prices fell, DVD sell-through (i.e. sales to end consumers on a 
buy-to-own basis) in dollar figures grew just 5%.  When including the shrinking VHS 
market, overall consumer spending on home video actually shrank by 1% from 2004-
2005.4 
                                                 
1 Data from Consumer Electronics Association eBrain Market Research statistics, dating 
back to 1954. 
2 According to a 2004 study by Jessica Reif-Cohen, media and entertainment Research 
Analyst at Merrill Lynch. 
3 Data and chart from the Digital Entertainment Group, a nonprofit trade consortium. 
4 Data from Bernstein Equity Research team. 
 3
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Sales trends for DVD hardware took a similar turn in 2005.  The NPD group 
analyzed retail sales on Black Friday5 2005 vs. 2004, showing that DVD players 
experienced double-digit declines on par with CRT televisions and portable CD players. 
Retail Sales Growth in Consumer Electronics:
Black Friday 2005 vs. 2004
Unit Growth Rev. Growth
LCDs over 26" 1008.3% 556.4%
Plasma TVs 210.0% 154.2%
LCDs under 26" 393.9% 133.1%
MP3 Players 194.1% 126.4%
Satellite Radios 203.1% 101.0%
DVD Recorders 163.9% 56.1%
Portable DVD Players 48.3% 5.8%
Camcorders 0.9% -0.7%
Direct View TVs (Regular CRT) -26.9% -29.0%
DVD Players -44.0% -45.2%
CRT Rear Projection -42.5% -51.5%
Personal CD Players -49.7% -52.7%  
                                                 
5 Black Friday, one of the major U.S. holiday shopping days, falls on the day after 
Thanksgiving every year. 
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 A number of theories explain this rapid and abrupt deceleration in DVD sales 
growth, including illegal piracy, new technology substitution such as video-on-demand 
and pay-per-view (Exhibits 1 & 2), and the growing popularity of rent-by-mail services 
like Netflix (Exhibit 3).  While these are all legitimate and likely contributing factors, this 
paper seeks to explain the changing growth trends through a market penetration 
hypothesis.  By examining home video sales data, academic research, and historical 
trends in consumer electronics, the data presents a life cycle driven theory for the rapidly 
slowing DVD business.  The popularity and understanding of this view is growing in the 
entertainment industry, and this paper seeks to quantify and clearly illustrate a concern 
that was recently articulated by Steve Beeks, President of Lionsgate Entertainment: “We 
all anticipated the maturing of the DVD business, and the corresponding slow-growth 
business that it would become, but it happened more quickly than we had anticipated.” 
 
II. A Brief History of Home Video 
 
Sony introduced the first commercially successful videocassette recorder (VCR) 
in 1975.  It was a bulky and expensive Betamax machine for which there was little 
prerecorded software at the time.  Just 11 years later, movie studios “generated more in 
domestic wholesale gross revenues from [sales and rentals of] home video (about $2 
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billion) than from theatrical ($1.6 billion) sources.”6  The home video market continued 
to grow through the 1990s, becoming the largest single component of studio revenues 
alongside theatrical receipts, sales to TV networks (i.e. Free TV), pay TV revenues, and 
licensing fees.  By 2004, home video sales accounted for 51% of studio top lines.7  By 
2005, home video profits at the major U.S. media conglomerates made up as much as 
35% of total firm operating income.8 
Studio Revenue Breakdown, 2004
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6 Vogel, pg. 103. 
7 Kagan Research estimates, based on $45.6 billion in 2004 worldwide studio revenue. 
8 Home Video estimates from Bernstein Research (revenue data) and Goldman Sachs 
Research (operating income data). 
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 During this period, Hollywood also began to shift its pricing model for home 
video products.  In the late 1970s and through the 1980s, “rental pricing” meant that 
studios charged exorbitant prices (up to $100 per VHS tape) to rental shops such as 
Blockbuster Video.  These retailers would then loan the movie out as many times as 
possible in order to recoup their initial outlay and eventually turn a profit.  The early 
1990s ushered in the “revenue sharing” model, in which studios sold VHS tapes to the 
same retailers for far less (as low as $5 per unit), but shared in the resulting rental 
revenues. 
The DVD era of the late 1990s and early 2000s led to today’s “sell-through” 
model.  This system focuses on the consumer buy-to-own market rather than the video 
rental market.  Studios charge retailers like Wal-Mart anywhere from $10-$30 per disc, 
and Wal-Mart then sells the products directly to consumers.  These changes in pricing 
models have drastically affected consumer behavior.  In fact, sell-through purchases now 
dominate rental purchases, making up over 70% of home video sales in 2005 (Exhibit 4).  
The emergence of the sell-through model also coincided with the decline in sales of pre-
recorded VHS tapes.  Exhibit 5 illustrates the breakdown of all home video sales (sell-
through and rental) between DVD and VHS tapes, with the latter representing just 6% of 
2005 home video revenues in the U.S. 
 
III. Rise of the DVD – The Hardware-Software Connection 
 Sales of DVDs, like sales of VHS tapes, depend upon customers possessing the 
hardware equipment to view the content at home.  Therefore, growth trends for discs 
should reflect growth patterns for DVD hardware (i.e. players), while trends for VHS 
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tapes should mirror those for VCRs.  Data from the Digital Entertainment Group9 and 
Adams Media Research confirm this hypothesis, as the unit shipment and growth charts 
below indicate similar sell-through trends for DVDs/DVD players and VHS tapes/VCRs. 
 
U.S. Unit Shipments: DVDs vs. DVD Players, 1997-2005
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U.S. Unit Shipments: DVDs vs. DVD Players, 1997-2005
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9 Note: The charts above include sales data for DVDs from the Digital Entertainment 
Group (DEG).  Figures include set-top and portable DVD players, Home-Theater-in-a-
Box systems, TV/DVD and DVD/VCR combination players. 
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U.S. Unit Shipments: VHS Tapes vs. VCRs, 1981-2004
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
U
ni
ts
 (m
ill
io
ns
)
0
5
10
15
20
25
U
ni
ts
 (m
ill
io
ns
)
VHS Unit Shipments VCR Player Shipments (Right Axis)
 
This link between software and hardware sales is prevalent for audio products as 
well.  The chart below indicates that shipments of music CDs closely mirror shipments of 
CD players.10  This makes intuitive sense, as both video and audio markets share similar 
characteristics of upfront hardware purchases followed by multiple software purchases.  
Furthermore, both products exhibit the hump-shaped growth curve common to consumer 
durables.  This will be discussed further in section five. 
U.S. Unit Shipments: CDs vs. CD Players, 1983-2004
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10 Data from the Recording Industry Association of America (CD units) and Consumer 
Electronics Association eBrain Market Research statistics (CD players). 
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IV. Rise of the DVD – Historical Comparisons of Hardware Penetration 
 Section 3 illustrated the close relationship between video players and discs, 
whereby hardware growth seemingly dictates the direction and magnitude of software 
growth.  Therefore, Hollywood executives should be able to simply forecast sales of 
DVD players in order to gauge growth trends in DVD software.11  Why, then, were so 
many of these same executives shocked when sales of DVD movies slowed dramatically 
in 2005? 
 The answer lies in the remarkably rapid penetration of DVD players across the 
U.S.  Few people could have predicted that DVD players would reach over 70% of 
American TV households a mere six years after commercial introduction.  VCRs 
achieved this same penetration rate in twelve years, CD players required 14 years, cell 
phones 18 years, and PCs nearly a quarter century (below).12 
Penetration of Consumer Electronics, 1978-2004
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11 There is research that shows the reverse effect of complementarity between DVD 
software availability and subsequent DVD player purchases, most notably by Pinar 
Karaca-Mandic at University of California at Berkeley.  Nevertheless, the relationship 
still stands between discs and players, whereby hardware sales and software sales move 
in tandem. 
12 Data from Consumer Electronics Association eBrain Market Research statistics. 
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The FCC compiled a similar chart of consumer product penetration, dating back 
to 1876 (Exhibit 6).  It is important to note that since the mid-20th century, rates of 
penetration have increased steadily for new or replacement technologies, a topic that will 
be addressed in section five.  Although DVD players are not included in the FCC chart, 
there is no other consumer product that matches DVD’s 70% penetration in seven years.  
Furthermore, no other product has moved up the lower segment of the penetration curve 
as quickly as DVD players.  Exhibit 7 shows that DVD hardware was in 25% of U.S. 
homes just 5 years after the technology was invented, displaying an outstanding rate of 
growth early in the product life cycle.  A consumer survey conducted in December 2005 
by IPSOS Public Affairs showed that DVD Players are now in over 80% of U.S. homes, 
eclipsing cell phone and PC penetration (below). 
Consumer Electronics Penetration, Dec. 2005
39%
28% 25% 24% 24%
75%75%
82%
88%88%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
VC
R
CD
 Pl
ay
er
DV
D 
Pla
ye
r
Ce
ll P
ho
ne PC
Ga
mi
ng
 C
on
so
le
HD
TV DV
R
MP
3 P
lay
er
Sa
tel
lite
 R
ad
io
 
There are numerous reasons for the rapid penetration of DVD hardware, such as 
inclusion of DVD players in PCs and gaming consoles, an easy-to-grasp technology 
transition from VCRs, and rapidly falling prices for the players themselves.  Various 
research models address these issues and shed light on the factors behind general 
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consumer product growth. The next section presents academic insights to explain the 
meteoric rise of the DVD, while also offering a glimpse into the future of the format. 
 
V. Rise of the DVD – Academic Models 
Everett Rogers and Innovation Diffusion 
The most well known research on technological adoption comes from Everett 
Rogers, who published his first edition of Diffusion of Innovations in 1962.  In this book, 
Rogers formalized the theory that technological innovations spread through society in an 
S-Curve of cumulative adoption.  Various consumer groups along this curve are 
categorized as innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, or laggards, based 
on their time of adoption and personal characteristics (below). 
 
 The S-Curve model not only identifies adopter groups, it also provides insights 
into product growth over the course of the life cycle.  For example, the S-shaped curve of 
adoption “takes off” in the range of 10-20 percent adoption.  Rogers identifies this 
segment as the “heart of the diffusion process,” after which point it is often impossible to 
stop further spread.  Conversely, diffusion growth slows in the 70-80 percent range, as 
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fewer remaining individuals adopt the innovation.  These theories are consistent across 
numerous consumer products, and modern research confirms that, “U.S. consumer 
adoption rates begin to flatten dramatically at penetration levels between 65% and 
80%.”13 
Rogers also conducted research that examined rates of adoption, defined as “the 
relative speed with which an innovation is adopted by members of a social system.”14  
This rate is typically measured by the number of people who adopt a product each year, 
and it serves as an indicator of the steepness of the adoption curve for a particular 
innovation.  Rogers’ writings indicate five variables that explain “from 49-87 percent of 
the variance in adoption rates”: relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, 
and observability.  These variables are classified under the title Perceived Attributes of 
Innovations, and DVD player technology scores highly across all these categories.  
Rogers also offers four additional variables, including type of innovation-decision, 
communication channels, nature of social system, and extent of change agents’ 
promotion efforts.  Again, DVDs score well in all these areas that display a linear 
relationship to rate of adoption (Exhibit 8). 
 
The Bass Model 
Professor Frank M. Bass from Purdue University used Rogers’ insights to develop 
a quantitative product growth model for consumer durables.  First proposed in 1969, the 
model identified two adopter categories; imitators, who are influenced by word-of-mouth 
communication (internal influence), and innovators, who are influenced by mass media 
                                                 
13 Nathanson, pg. 4. 
14 Rogers, pg. 206. 
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communication (external influence).  The Bass Model converts this concept to a 
quantitative form, in which each influence is represented by a variable.  The former 
variable is referred to as the “coefficient of imitation” while the latter is referred to as the 
“coefficient of innovation.” 
This model has been used to accurately predict and explain product growth trends 
over the past 40 years.  Critics claim that Bass’ work is overly simplistic, as it considers 
only two adopter categories and uses past data for comparable products as the basis for 
future predictions.  Nevertheless, the Bass Model illustrates a growth pattern (Exhibit 9) 
very similar to that proposed by Rogers and entirely consistent with the eight years of 
data available from the DVD hardware industry. 
 
The Takeoff Model 
Research by Professor Peter Golder (NYU Stern School of Business) and Gerard 
Tellis (USC Marshall School of Business) provides additional insight into rates of 
product adoption.  Their “takeoff model” predicts the distinct point in the product life 
cycle at which the transition occurs from introductory stage to growth stage.  This is 
represented as an elbow-shaped discontinuity in the sales curve, typically with an 
“average sales increase of over 400%.”  This feature is often ignored in diffusion models, 
which tend to depict adoption of new consumer durables with smooth curves.  As 
mentioned earlier, Everett Rogers made brief reference to this phenomenon, broadly 
characterizing product takeoff as the time between 10-20 percent penetration. 
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By following Golder and Tellis’ model, we can show that DVD player takeoff 
occurred in early 1999, just two years after commercialization and at a rate far greater 
than takeoff for VCRs (below).15 
U.S. Product Takeoff: DVD Players vs. VCRs
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Years After Commercialization
DVD Player Shipments VCR Player Shipments (Right Axis)  
In fact, DVD player sales have far outpaced historical sales averages for new 
consumer durables, as calculated by Golder and Tellis (below).16 
Average Sales History of Really New Consumer Durables
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15 Data from Consumer Electronics Association eBrain Market Research statistics. 
16 Golder P. and G. Tellis. (2004, Vol. 23, No. 2), pg. 213. 
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Two years following commercial introduction, DVD hardware shipments eclipsed 
500,000 units per quarter at a growth rate of 300% on a year-over-year basis.  By 
comparison, Golder and Tellis found that the average time to takeoff for 16 post-World 
War II categories is six years.  To understand DVD’s rapid movement into the growth 
stage, it is important to examine the primary drivers of takeoff.  The research identifies 
three primary independent variables (price, year of introduction, market penetration) and 
two control variables (product-specific characteristics and economic conditions).  As in 
the Rogers model, we find that DVD technology exceeds the averages for each of these 
variables, leading to a remarkably early and strong takeoff for the product (Exhibit 10). 
 
Evolving Process Model for new Product Sales 
 The three previous academic models explained rates of hardware adoption in the 
U.S., however it is worth examining a relatively unrelated theory that applies to DVD 
software purchasing.  Rather than confront the early growth segment of the life cycle, 
Professor Peter Fader at Wharton considers repeat purchases that occur after consumers 
gain more experience with a product.  This evolving process model assumes that 
consumers become more regular in their buying behavior over time, moving from an 
initial stage of exponential purchasing to a steady state.  While Fader’s model deals 
primarily with the regularity of timing between purchases, there is significant evidence 
that also shows a decrease in buying frequency for DVDs. 
 A USA Today article from early 2005 claimed, “if you look at the average 
number of DVDs bought by the DVD homes, the peak of 25 was in 1998; the past few 
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years it has been about 15.”17  According to Dan Ernst, a media analyst with Soleil 
Securities, in 1999 the average owner of a DVD player was buying 20 DVDs each year.  
By mid-2005, he wrote that the number had dropped to about 14 DVDs sold per 
household per year.18  Holly Wagner, senior editor with Home Media Retailing, offered 
anecdotal evidence, “Now that everyone has a DVD player, they aren’t rushing out to buy 
the first of everything.”19 
It appears that as the market matures for DVD players, household purchasing of 
DVDs has cooled as the novelty and excitement of technological adoption wears off. 
 
VI. The Next S-Curve? 
 Movie studios and home video executives are beginning to realize that the golden 
goose of DVD is near its end.  Scott Hettrick, editor-in-chief of trade publications Video 
Business and DVD Exclusive said it best, “The DVD market matured much more quickly 
than anyone expected…there is little growth left.”20  DVD hardware sped up the diffusion 
S-Curve more quickly than any other consumer product in American history.  As a result, 
sales of DVD players and discs came to a screeching halt well before the industry 
predicted.  Perhaps the largest factor, as described in Golder and Tellis’ takeoff model, 
was falling prices for hardware (below) that spurred rapid adoption in the U.S.  In their 
follow-up research,21 the two professors found significant evidence that product 
                                                 
17 Snider, M. (2005, January 5). DVD Continues Spinning Success. USA Today. 
18 Fost, D. (2005, September 5). Consumers Changing DVD Buying Habits. San 
Francisco Chronicle. 
19 Same as above. 
20 Snider, M. (2006, January 4). Video Slips as DVD Market Matures; Hopes Pinned on 
‘High-Def.’ USA Today. 
21 Golder P. and G. Tellis. (2004, Vol. 23, No. 2), pg. 213. 
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slowdown is positively correlated with adoption, specifically that “every 1% increase in 
penetration is associated with a 3.9% increase in the probability of a slowdown.”22  As 
Mr. Hettrick stated in early 2006, “The industry shot itself in the foot by lowering DVD 
prices too much and too quickly.” 
ASPs of Consumer Electronics Hardware, 1980-2004
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 Golder and Tellis’ work on product slowdown has other important implications 
for the fading future of the DVD business.  The researchers discovered that products with 
large sales increases at takeoff tend to have larger sales declines at slowdown, an 
ominous portent for DVDs.  Additionally, the two found that leisure-enhancing products 
(e.g. DVD players, color TVs, VCRs) have a negative effect on the duration of the 
growth stage. 
The multi-billion dollar question in Hollywood is, of course, what’s next?  Online 
downloads and pay-per-view purchasing offer a glimpse into a disc-less future, but the 
industry is placing its high-growth bets on High Definition DVD.  This upgrade to 
                                                 
22 Golder and Tellis define slowdown as the first year, of two consecutive years after 
takeoff, in which sales are lower than the highest previous sales.  Although this point has 
not yet arrived for the DVD industry, it could very well occur in 2007 or 2008. 
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existing DVD technology offers increased storage space that allows for even higher-
resolution video and a wealth of additional content, in addition to superior profit margins. 
However, as this paper illustrates, there are numerous variables that affect the 
success of a new consumer product.  Companies must work together to introduce a 
technology that possesses Rogers’ key ingredients and has strong takeoff potential.  At 
the same time, content producers and hardware manufacturers should avoid excessive 
supply-side increases that lead to rapid price reductions and shorter product life cycles.  
On a positive note, recent research into new product development identified demand 
growth as a second leading factor in successful launches.23  Agarwal and Bayus found 
that, “outward shifting supply and demand curves lead to market takeoff.” Thus, firm 
entry and activity geared towards increasing product quality may be just as important as 
price declines in determining success.  This is certainly good news for product managers, 
and it suggests that, “sales growth does not have to necessarily come at the expense of 
compressed profit margins.” 
If the home video industry can strike the right balance between innovation and 
supply-side management, perhaps there is another round of growth ahead.  Just in time to 
replace the relatively young – yet faltering – DVD. 
 
                                                 
23 Agarwal, R. and B. Bayus. 
 19
Exhibit 1 
Video-On-Demand (VOD) Usage
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Source: ICR CENTRIS Omnibus Survey (conducted 11/11/05-11/16/05) 
Base used is total digital cable households where Video-On-Demand is available 
 
Exhibit 2 
Video-On-Demand (VOD) Growth, 1999-2004
$0
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250
$300
$350
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
U
S$
 (m
ill
io
ns
)
-1%
4%
9%
14%
19%
24%
VOD Consumer Spending VOD Penetration (Right Axis)  
 
Source: Nielsen Media Research, Adams Media Research, Video Store Magazine 
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Exhibit 3 
U.S. Netflix Subscribers, 2001-2005
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Source: Netflix company data 
 
Exhibit 4 
U.S. Home Video Sales: Sell-Through vs. Rental, 2001-2005
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Source: The Digital Entertainment Group, 2006 
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Exhibit 5 
U.S. Home Video Sales: DVD vs. VHS, 2001-2005
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Source: The Digital Entertainment Group, 2006 
 
Exhibit 6 
Penetration of Consumer Technologies, 1876-19
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Source: For "households" (1876-1900) and "homes with electricity" (1908-11, 1913-16, 1918-20), FCC 
staff estimates based on Census Bureau information.  For CD players, Consumer Electronics Manufacturers 
Association data (June 1999).  For Direct Broadcast Satellite, THE SATELLITE REPORT 1999, by Global 
Satellite Research, C.E. Unterberg, Towbin (1999).  For all other data, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES, by US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, 
1979, 1982-83, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1998) and HISTORICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, by US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census (1975). 
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Exhibit 7 
Penetration Rates of Popular Technologies, from Time of 
Invention
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Consumer Electronics Association 
 
Exhibit 8 
Variables Determining the Rate of Adoption of Innovations
DVD Diffusion in the U.S.
I. Perceived Attributes of Innovation
1. Relative advantage Substantial benefits over analog technology: improved sound and 
picture, more content, fast scene selection, smaller physical footprint.  
Economic benefit of falling prices for players and discs over time, 
becoming even cheaper than VCRs and VHS tapes.
2. Compatibility Single format for DVD reduced consumer confusion and facilitated 
production of hardware and peripherals (i.e. avoided costly VHS-
Beta war).  DVD falls neatly within the home entertainment product 
landscape and is compatible with American beliefs regarding 
technological innovation and improved quality of life.
3. Complexity Relatively easy to understand and use.  DVDs are also very similar in 
function to preceding analog VCR technology (i.e. playback, FF, 
Rewind, etc).
4. Trialability Wide range of trial options, including friends, neighbors, and 
electronics stores.
5. Observability Benefits of DVD innovation are clearly observable, in the form of 
drastically improved video resolution, quick access to content, and 
superb sound.
II. Type of Innovation-Decision Individual, optional purchase decision does not require groups or 
higher authority.
III. Communication Channels Well organized mass media channels plus widespread interpersonal 
communication (i.e. word of mouth).
IV. Nature of the Social System Technologically advanced, with highly interconnected communication 
network.
V. Extent of Change Agents' Promotion Efforts Coordinated advertising and marketing from electronics and 
entertainment industries.  
 
Source: Everett Rogers Diffusion of Innovations
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Exhibit 9 
Bass Model Formulation 
 
Cumulative number of adopters = Nt = Nt−1 + p(m − Nt−1) + q Nt−1m (m − Nt−1)  
m = number of people who will adopt (i.e. total market size) 
N(t-1) = number who have already adopted at a point in time t 
p = tendency to adopt (coefficient of innovation – external factors such as media coverage) 
q = likelihood of adoption (coefficient of imitation – internal factors such as word of 
mouth/social contagion) 
 
Analytical Structure of the Bass New Product Diffusion Model 
 
 
Source: Mahajan, V., Muller, E., & Bass, F.M. (1990, Vol. 54, No. 1). New Product Diffusion Models in 
Marketing: A Review and Directions for Research. Journal of Marketing, pg. 4. 
 
Exhibit 10 
 
Variables Determining Takeoff
I. Independent Variables Golder & Tellis Comments Average Takeoff DVD Takeoff
1. Price "Probably the single most important factor." To standardize 
measurements of price, G&T divided the price of each product in 
each period by that product's initial price.
Price = 63% of 
introductory 
price.
Price = 58% of 
introductory 
price.
2. Year of Introduction G&T posit that the introductory stage of the product life cycle is 
shortening over time, and takeoff occurs earlier than in the past.  
Thus, they expect year of introduction to be positively correlated 
with takeoff.
Time from 
introduction to 
takeoff = 6 years
Time from 
introduction to 
takeoff = 2 years
3. Market Penetration Defined as the percentage of households that have purchased 
the new product.  Everett Rogers' research on diffusion 
indicates a distinct threshold (2.5%) at which products move to 
mass market. Plus, availability of complementary products implies
relationship between market penetration and takeoff.
Penetration at 
takeoff = 1.7%
Penetration at 
takeoff = 2.1%
II. Control Variables
1. Product-Specific 
Characteristics
These include type of product (leisure, time-saving, electronic 
good) and whether sales depend on externalities such as 
software.
Not significant DVD is an 
electronic good
2. Economic Conditions These include GNP, total number of households, consumer 
sentiment.
Not significant Strong GDP 
growth, budget 
surplus, and high 
consumer 
sentiment may be 
factors  
 
Source: Golder and Tellis “Will It Ever Fly? Modeling the Takeoff of Really New Consumer Durables.”
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